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In response to Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption:
Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789 (2006).
As with any social movement, it is impossible to speak simply of
“the goals” of the American disability rights movement. The movement embraces an array of different people, with different disabilities,
ideologies, and interests. It therefore has a multiplicity of different
1
goals, which are sometimes in tension with each other. But if there is
one goal that has achieved near-consensus status among disability
rights supporters, the goal of integration is a strong candidate. Disability rights activists have frequently argued against isolating people
with disabilities within disability-only institutions; rather, activists wish
to ensure that people with disabilities are fully integrated into the nation’s economic and civic life. The major disability rights laws—the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)—reflect this strong support of integra2
tion.
When as prominent a scholar and disability rights supporter as
Ruth Colker writes an article questioning the IDEA’s individualized
3
integration presumption, then, it is a major event. Professor Colker’s
∗

Apologies to John Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?—Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L.
REV. 719 (1973).
†
Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development,
Washington University School of Law. Thanks to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for creating such a great forum and inviting me to participate in it. Thanks also to
Ruth Colker for writing a provocative and important article, and to Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and, as always, Margo Schlanger for helpful discussions of these issues.
Work on this essay was supported by a summer research grant from Washington University Law.
1
This point is central to my forthcoming book, SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (forthcoming 2008).
2
For a discussion of the centrality of integration to the American disability rights
movement, with a particular focus on the ADA, see Timothy M. Cook, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393 (1991).
3
Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 789 (2006); see id. at 811 & n.86 (introducing the IDEA’s integration presumption
rule). To be sure, Professor Colker says that she does not believe the IDEA’s integra-
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article is admirably driven by the Enlightenment sensibility that facts,
and not abstract ideology, should drive policy. She is quite correct, in
my view, that the disability rights movement does itself a disservice if it
ignores the lessons of experience and clings to ideologically-driven
4
policies that have not succeeded. Professor Colker has begun an important conversation—one that should be engaged critically and vigorously.
Nonetheless, Professor Colker has not convinced me. Her article
fails to establish that the IDEA’s individualized integration presumption imposes significant costs, and she seems to downplay significant
benefits of that presumption. As currently framed, the individualized
integration presumption does not prevent a school district from providing a separate placement to a child with a disability when that is
truly the best option for her. It merely requires the school district to
demonstrate that its chosen course is, in fact, the best option. That
burden, it seems to me, is fully justified. Teachers and school officials
too often simply find it easier to deal with people who are different by
putting them aside in “special” settings rather than implementing the
changes necessary to make the regular settings more accessible. This
is a recurring problem in disability rights law, and a number of Professor Colker’s examples of the supposed failure of integration seem instead to reflect the education system’s refusal to provide true integration. In the remainder of this essay, I will elaborate on these points.
I. THE COSTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM: HAS PROFESSOR COLKER MADE
HER CASE?
Although she argues against the individualized integration presumption, Professor Colker concedes that many children with disabili-

tion presumption should be abandoned entirely, but she would reframe the presumption so that it merely requires that school districts provide an array of different settings
for students with disabilities generally. See id. at 801 (“If a school district is offering a
range of educational options to children with disabilities in learning, then an integration presumption is not warranted.” (footnote omitted)). Because Professor Colker’s
proposal would eliminate the presumption that individual students should be placed
in the most integrated setting appropriate to their disabilities—which is the essence of
the integration presumption as I will defend it—I believe it proper to speak of her
proposal as one for abolition of the individualized integration presumption.
4
I have made a similar point before. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans
with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 527, 558-62 (2004) (arguing that disability rights advocates must confront,
rather than deny, the data that suggest that the ADA has not moved many people with
disabilities into the workforce).
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ties will benefit from being placed in truly integrated settings. Those
children, she agrees, should receive integrated placements. Her concern is for other children, who she believes would benefit from being
placed in more segregated environments. In her view, the individualized integration presumption improperly directs the second group of
5
children to the mainstream placements that will disserve them.
In arguing that the individualized integration presumption keeps
children from placements they need, Professor Colker has a difficult
task. The integration presumption is, after all, just a presumption.
The statutory provision creating it requires integration only “[t]o the
maximum extent appropriate,” and it specifically contemplates that
“special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with
disabilities from the regular educational environment” will occur
when “the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
6
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” That provision, by its very
terms, requires an individualized analysis to determine what placement is “appropriate” for each child with a disability.
Professor Colker’s indictment of the integration presumption focuses not on the statutory standard itself but on the cases that have interpreted it. She states that some courts have read the presumption in
a way that requires integration even when that is not in the interest of
the child with a disability. But her evidence of that phenomenon is
thin at best. Professor Colker relies principally on two cases: Roncker
ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1983; and
Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, decided by the Fifth Circuit in
7
1989. I doubt that two appellate cases, decided so long ago, can tell
us much about the practice on the ground in school districts across
the country today. But neither Roncker nor Daniel R.R. makes Professor Colker’s point in any event.
Professor Colker states that “[t]he integration presumption ap8
pears to have been irrebuttable in Roncker.” That seems to me a massive overreading of the case. The Sixth Circuit expressly refrained
from deciding whether Neill Roncker was entitled to a more integrated placement. It decided only that the district court had erred by
5

See Colker, supra note 3, at 796 (arguing that the individualized integration presumption prevents appropriate education “for some children”).
6
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
7
See Colker, supra note 3, at 811-12, 814-21 (discussing Roncker ex rel. Roncker v.
Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) and Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d
1036 (5th Cir. 1989)).
8
Id. at 816.
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reviewing the school district’s actions under an abuse of discretion
standard; the court then remanded “in order to allow the district
court to re-examine the mainstreaming issue in light of the proper
9
standard of review.” In its one-page discussion of the legal standards
to be applied on remand, the Sixth Circuit expressly contemplated
“that some handicapped children simply must be educated in segregated facilities either because the handicapped child would not benefit from mainstreaming, [or] because any marginal benefits received
from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from
services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated
10
setting.” This is hardly the stuff of an “irrebuttable” presumption.
Professor Colker notes the Sixth Circuit’s statement that Neill
Roncker’s apparent lack of progress in the more integrated setting
11
was “not dispositive.” Considered in context, however, the court’s
point seems to me entirely sensible:
Although Neill’s progress, or lack thereof, at Pleasant Ridge is a relevant
factor in determining the maximum appropriate extent to which he can
be mainstreamed, it is not dispositive since the district court must determine whether Neill could have been provided with additional services, such as those provided at the [segregated] county schools, which
12
would have improved his performance at Pleasant Ridge.

In determining whether a more integrated placement is appropriate
for a particular child, it certainly makes sense to consider that child’s
past experience in integrated settings. But it also makes sense to ask
whether a child’s poor past experience reflected not anything inherent in those settings, but simply the school district’s failure to adequately support the child once she was placed there. And that’s all
the Sixth Circuit said. I don’t see how Roncker reflects an “irrebuttable” presumption of integration.
Daniel R.R. lends even less support to Professor Colker’s argument. After all, in that case the Fifth Circuit held that the more seg13
regated placement was the proper one for Daniel. In other words,
after considering all the facts, the court concluded that the integration presumption was rebutted. Nonetheless, Professor Colker asserts

9

Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1062.
Id. at 1063.
11
Colker, supra note 3, at 815 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063).
12
Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
13
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989).
10
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that the court adopted a standard that would make it too hard to overcome the presumption in other cases, by “requir[ing] that the school
district demonstrate that Daniel could attain no educational benefit in
14
the more integrated environment.” But Daniel R.R. imposed no such
requirement, and Professor Colker does not point, in any event, to
any subsequent cases that applied that precedent to demand that a
child be placed in an inappropriate integrated setting. The Daniel
R.R. court merely required the school district to prove, on the basis of
15
“an individualized, fact-specific inquiry,” “that education in the regu16
lar classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”
That inquiry, the
court held, must not just look to “whether the child will receive an
educational benefit from regular education,” but must also “examine
the child’s overall educational experience in the mainstreamed environment, balancing the benefits of regular and special education for
17
each individual child.” That standard hardly suggests any particular
“skepticism about the value of special education”—much less a “pro18
found” skepticism.
Professor Colker is persuasive that not every child with a disability
is best served in the most integrated setting possible. But the integration presumption recognizes that point and requires nothing more
than the most integrated setting appropriate to the individual child. Although mistakes will inevitably occur-–in both directions—in interpreting and applying such a fact-specific legal standard, Professor
Colker has not demonstrated that the standard has in practice systematically pushed children with disabilities into inappropriate settings.
II. THE BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM: WHAT PROFESSOR COLKER
UNDERSTATES
Professor Colker has not established that the individualized integration presumption has the costs she attributes to it. Equally important, she significantly understates the benefits of the presumption.
Professor Colker argues that the integration presumption’s initial
purpose was a systematic one—to end the use of separate, disability19
only institutions as the only option for children with disabilities.
That point is fine as far as it goes, but the individualized integration
14
15
16
17
18
19

Colker, supra note 3, at 820 (citing Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050).
Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1049.
Colker, supra note 3, at 820.
Id. at 795.
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presumption continues to have value even in school districts that have
an array of different placements for children with disabilities.
The essential problem is that accommodating difference is rarely
the easy path for an institution. Professor Colker acknowledges that
many children with disabilities will benefit from an integrated school
setting. But successful integration may require changes to the regular
school environment and additional interventions to support the students with disabilities. As Professor Minow argued some time ago,
those changes and interventions can end up improving the education
of all children in the classroom—those with disabilities and those
20
without. But absent an individualized integration presumption, that
kind of beneficial integration is far less likely to occur. Unless broken
out of their inertia, too many school districts will readily conclude that
integration is too hard to achieve, and that separate placements are an
easy and effective solution. Looking at the regular education setting
only as it currently exists, school administrators will conclude that
separate placements are better—even when integration (bolstered by
changes to the regular setting) would promote more successful outcomes.
The history of disability in America is full of assertions—made by
nondisabled parents and medical and educational professionals,
among others—that people with disabilities are best served in sepa21
rate, “special” settings. I believe those assertions were made in good
faith. But time and again, they have proven wrong. Too often our
failure to appreciate the possibilities of integration, and our inability
to break free from the inertia that has kept us from undertaking the
necessary changes that could make our mainstream institutions accessible, has led us to believe that segregation is the best way.
The closing of Pennsylvania’s Pennhurst State School and Hospital provides one of the more dramatic examples of this phenomenon.
As Professor Colker points out, “many parents and guardians” of
Pennhurst residents joined the state in opposing deinstitutionaliza-

20

See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 84-86 (1990) (highlighting, for example, a classroom setting in which
course material is conveyed simultaneously by spoken word and sign language, and
noting the positive impact this has on both deaf and nondeaf students).
21
For a great discussion of this issue, see MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY:
CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 84-115
(2003). At this point, I should note in the interest of full disclosure that I am a nondisabled parent of a child with a disability.
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22

tion. They did so because they thought their children with mental
retardation—most of whom were by then adults—could not make it in
integrated, community settings. In one important case from Pennhurst, Youngberg v. Romeo ex rel. Romeo, the resident’s own lawyer conceded that, “in light of the severe character of his retardation,” the
23
resident could never be deinstitutionalized.
But that concession
turned out to be dramatically wrong. Soon after his lawyer made that
concession, “Nicholas Romeo moved to a community residence in
24
Philadelphia,” where he thrived. Indeed, the closing of Pennhurst is
widely considered to be a success, in which people with disabilities
who were thought to need a segregated environment in fact did better
25
when they moved to more integrated settings in the community. It is
odd that Professor Colker treats the case as a negative example.
Many of Professor Colker’s reasons for why segregated settings
might be better suggest inertia, rather than anything inherently wrong
with integrated ones. Professor Colker states, as one reason why separate settings can be better, that children with learning disabilities “are
26
often not accepted by their classroom teacher” in regular classrooms.
She also quotes a study that states, “[T]he instructional adaptations
that general educators make in response to students’ persistent failure
to learn are typically oriented to the group, not to the individual, and
27
are relatively minor in substance . . . .” To accept these points as arguments against an integration requirement is simply to acquiesce to
resistance to that requirement. If schools and teachers are refusing to
accommodate children with disabilities in the regular learning environment, the solution is to make them change. That sort of resistance
is a principal target of disability rights laws—it is not an argument for
refusing to apply those laws.
To be clear, my point is not that every child with every disability
should be fully included in the mainstream setting. My point is only
that many children with disabilities should be in more integrated settings than school officials think. The individualized integration pre-

22

Colker, supra note 3, at 792 n.6 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class
Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1211-12 (1982)).
23
457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
24
Cook, supra note 2, at 443.
25
For a detailed examination of the aftermath of Pennhurst’s closure, see JAMES
W. CONROY & VALERIE J. BRADLEY, THE PENNHURST LONGITUDINAL STUDY: COMBINED
REPORT OF FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (1985).
26
Colker, supra note 3, at 834.
27
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Douglas Fuchs & Lynn S.
Fuchs, What’s “Special” About Special Education?, 76 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 522, 528 (1995)).
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sumption is an important response to that problem.
CONCLUSION
Professor Colker has been studying, defending, and enforcing disability rights laws since I was in high school. When a scholar with her
prominence and track record begins an important debate like this, it
is one that must be engaged. And the sensibility that underlies her
argument is exceptionally important: if the IDEA’s individualized integration presumption is harming children with disabilities, we need
to know that and change our policies accordingly.
Professor Colker is persuasive that not all children with disabilities
are best served in the most integrated setting possible. But she has
not shown that the IDEA has pushed children into inappropriately integrated settings in significant numbers. Nor has she dispelled the
concern that abolishing the individualized integration presumption
would drive significant numbers of children with disabilities back to
inappropriately segregated placements. Unless she and other critics can
fill in these gaps in their case against the individualized integration
presumption, there is no reason to abolish it.
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